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ABSTRACT

Failure-to-warn cases represent a significant portion of product
liability law, yet the core concepts of this body of law arepoorly developed.
In particular, the standard tort requirement that the injured party
demonstrate a causal connection between the defendant's violation of duty
and the injury simply does not work in the vast majority offailure-to-warn
cases. A substantialbody of social science literature demonstrates that, in
all but extreme cases, it is impossiblefor an injured party to demonstrate
by a preponderance of the evidence-and thus for a court credibly to
conclude-that the party would have acted differently had a warning been
provided. Thus, a rigorous application of the causation requirementwould
result in defeat for most injuredparties. Yet, some injuries certainly could
be prevented by effective warnings, even if those beneficiaries cannot be
easily identified. A legal system that denies recovery to virtually all injured
parties because it cannot ascertainwhich parties' injuries would have been
prevented undercompensates victims and underdeters dangerouspractices
by product manufacturers and distributors, and thus does not fulfill the
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goals of the tort system. Some courts and commentators have recognized
this problem and have put forth a variety of mechanisms to resolve it.
Those mechanisms-such as "heeding presumptions" and enterprise
liability-suffer from the opposite problem: they compensate injured
parties without regardfor whether there is a causal connection between the
lack of a warning and the injuries. The result is overcompensation of
plaintiffs, overdeterrence of manufacturers, and underdeterrence of risky
consumer conduct. This too fails to fulfill the goals of tort law. In this
Article, the authors propose eliminating causation as an independent
requirement in most failure-to-warn cases and instead determining an
injured party's recovery by allowing proportional recovery, taking into
account both the severity of the manufacturer'sfault in failing to warn of
the dangers associated with its product and the likelihood that the
plaintiffs injuries would have been prevented by a warning.Such a system
would recognize that some failures to warn are more egregious than others
and would generate a closer match between aggregatecompensation and
aggregate injuries caused by afailure to warn.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Causation remains the problem child of product liability failure-towarn law. Even if it is established that a manufacturer or distributor had a
duty to warn end users about a particular risk and that such a warning was
not given, the combination of substantive tort law and standard rules of
civil litigation requires an injured end user to demonstrate a causal
connection between the absent warning and the injury. Such a causal
connection necessarily has three steps: first, that the end user would have
read the warning; second, that the end user would have acted differently
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had he or she been warned of the risk at issue; and third, that had the end
user acted differently in light of the warning, he or she would not have
suffered the injury (or the injury would have been less severe).' It is our
contention that (1) factual adjudication of this three-step causal connection
is beyond the capability of our legal system in all but the simplest cases;
(2) the legal system's occasional and sporadic responses to its implicit
recognition of the difficulties of this factual adjudication are not well suited
to the social policies that underlie tort law in general and product liability
law in particular; and (3) recent academic commentary that uses skepticism
about the efficacy of warnings to justify the imposition of enterprise
liability replicates, rather than cures, much of the arbitrariness of the
current flawed system. We argue that rather than trying to fit a causation
standard that will often be nonjusticiable as a practical matter into standard
proof models in civil litigation, the tort system should eliminate proof of
factual causation as the sine qua non of recovery in failure-to-warn cases
and instead consider fault and causation together as a single unified issue
for which the fact finder can find gradations of responsibility.
In product liability law, the issue of causation in failure-to-warn
litigation involves inherent uncertainties that are different in both kind and
degree from the difficulties associated with proof of facts in other product
liability contexts. For example, in product liability cases predicated on a
defective design or a manufacturing defect (rather than on a failure to
warn), expert testimony can credibly resolve whether a safer alternative
design or a product without a manufacturing defect would have avoided the
plaintiff's injury. After all, such matters of science and engineering often
can be addressed in ways that give us confidence that the conclusions
drawn are accurate and not dependent on plumbing the murky recesses of
human decisionmaking. 2 Indeed, in failure-to-warn cases in which doubt
arises regarding whether the product in question brought about the
plaintiffs physical injury, courts have had little difficulty resolving the
issue. Even in toxic tort cases, when the fact-finding process can provide at
best a probabilistic assessment as to causation of the plaintiffs injury, the
1.

See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS

§ 367

(2000); DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS

LIABILITY LAW § 11.4, at 756 (2005).
2. OWEN, supra note 1, § 11.4, at 758 (noting that in manufacturing and design defect cases,
"the factual causation issue typically is clear. The reason for this difference [between these cases and

failure-to-warn cases] lies in the wide gulf between Newtonian physics and Freudian psychology"). See
also Gen. Motors Corp. v. Saenz, 873 S.W.2d 353, 357 (Tex. 1993) ("Proving causation in a failure-towarn case has peculiar difficulties. Proof that a collision between two cars would not have happened
had defendant swerved or braked or driven within the speed limit is mostly a matter of physics. Proof
that an accident would not have occurred if defendant had provided adequate warnings concerning the
use of a product is more psychology and does not admit of the same degree of certainty.").
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difficulties faced by the courts relate to the substantive law issue of how to
treat such probabilities of injury causation rather than to the very different
problem of confidently assessing whether a plaintiff would have made a
different decision under different circumstances.3
In the bulk of failure-to-warn cases, however, in which there is
significant and irreducible uncertainty as to whether the plaintiff would
have acted differently had he or she been provided with a warning about
the risk that ultimately gave rise to the injury, courts have floundered. As
we noted in an earlier series of articles in the related field of informed
consent, it is often impossible to determine with any degree of confidence
whether a particular plaintiff would have chosen to reject a medical
procedure had his or her physician provided risk information attendant to
its administration. 4 Yet, the plaintiffs situation in informed consent cases
is, at its base, merely a specialized failure-to-warn case. In both informed
consent and failure-to-warn cases, (1) the plaintiff has acted without
information that perhaps would have led to a different decision, and (2) as
traditionally formulated, the cause of action requires the plaintiff to
demonstrate that a different (and less harmful) decision would have been
made had that information been provided. In the case of product-related
risks, however, the causation issue is even more attenuated than in the
narrower context of informed consent. Unlike informed consent cases, in
which we can confidently posit that a hypothetical warning would have
been heard by the patient had the physician fulfilled his or her duty of
disclosure, in product warning cases there is necessarily greater uncertainty
about whether the plaintiff would even have read a warning had it been
given.5 Moreover, how a plaintiff would have responded to a warning is
even more speculative than it is in the informed consent situation.6 Unlike
the binary decision that confronts a plaintiff in an informed consent setting
(that is, either go forward with the medical procedure or not), product users
have a multitude of options available to them in deciding how or whether to
use a product. They may choose modes of use reflecting various degrees of
danger (ranging from use without regard for the warning to safer modes of
3. See infra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, Informed Decision Making and the Law of
Torts: The Myth ofJusticiable Causation, 1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 607 (1988) [hereinafter Twerski &
Cohen, Informed Decision Making] (discussing the impossibility of determining whether a particular
patient would have chosen to reject a medical procedure had the doctor informed him or her of the risks
involved); Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, The Second Revolution in Informed Consent:
ComparingPhysiciansto Each Other, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1999) [hereinafter Twerski & Cohen,
ComparingPhysicians].
5. See infra text accompanying notes 19-29.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 19-29.
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use) or they may choose to use a different product entirely for the task at
hand.
This dilemma, which makes it nearly impossible in any real sense for
an injured end user to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that
he or she would have heeded a hypothetical warning that the manufacturer
hypothetically may have given and thereby avoided injury, has not gone
unnoticed. Scholars have advocated and many courts have adopted a
"heeding presumption," 7 shifting either the burden of coming forward or
the burden of proof to the manufacturer.8 As a practical matter, many of the
decisions implementing the heeding presumption have imposed the
functional equivalent of enterprise liability in failure-to-warn cases. 9 On the
other hand, a fair number of courts have refused to adopt a heeding
presumption,' 0 or have permitted the rebuttal of the heeding presumption
on specious grounds," leaving the plaintiff in jeopardy of no recovery
whatsoever. Despite the application of the heeding presumption, the
problem persists. Even in cases in which we have good reason to believe
that some users would have been influenced by a warning, we have no way
to separate those users from others who would not have been so influenced.
In this Article, we argue that the traditional tort system applied
without artificial presumptions and the proposed solutions (court created
and academically advocated) intended to change the results that would
follow from the application of traditional rules-both of which are
essentially all-or-nothing approaches in which the end user is either held to
have established causation or not-are inappropriate for failure-to-warn
7. See, e.g., David A. Fischer, Causation in Fact in Product Liability Failureto Warn Cases, 17
J. PRODUCTS & Toxic LIABILITY 271, 274-75 (1995); Mark Geistfeld, Inadequate Product Warnings
and Causation, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 309, 310 n.7 (1997); Alan Schwartz, Causation in Private
Tort Law: A Comment on Kelman, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 639, 644 (1987). The seminal case advocating
a rebuttable presumption that a warning, had it been given, would have been read and heeded is
Technical Chemical Co. v. Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602, 606 (Tex. 1972). Other states have followed suit.
E.g., Nissen Trampoline Co. v. Terre Haute First Nat'l Bank, 332 N.E.2d 820, 826 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975),
rev'd on other grounds, 358 N.E.2d 974 (Ind. 1976); Coffman v. Keene Corp., 628 A.2d 710, 720 (N.J.
1993); Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co., 423 N.E.2d 831, 838 (Ohio 1981); Cunningham v. Charles Pfizer&
Co., 532 P.2d 1377, 1382 (Okla. 1974).
8. Throughout this paper we refer to the defendant as the manufacturer. We recognize that
under strict liability, the entire distributive chain may be held liable when a product is marketed with
inadequate warning. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § I cmt. e (1998).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 33-43.
10. See, e.g., Latiolais v. Merck & Co., No. CV 06-02208, 2007 WL 5861354, at *4 (C.D. Cal.
Feb. 6, 2007) (stating that no California court has adopted the heeding presumption); Lord v. Sigueiros,
No. CV 040243, 2006 WL 1510408, at *3-4 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 26, 2006); Riley v. Am. Honda
Motor Co., 856 P.2d 196, 200 (Mont. 1993); Rivera v. Philip Morris, Inc., 209 P.3d 271, 274 (Nev.
2009).
I1. See infra text accompanying notes 44-65.
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cases. They overcompensate many plaintiffs and undercompensate others,
as well as overcompensating plaintiffs as a class or undercompensating
plaintiffs as a class. The case for enterprise liability has the support of such
noted scholars as Jon Hanson, Douglas Kysar,12 and Mark Geistfeld.' 3
While some of these scholars may advocate enterprise liability in all tort
cases-not just those predicated on a failure to warn-we show that, even
if one were to limit enterprise liability to failure-to-warn cases, their
arguments for that solution to the warning problem are seriously flawed.
We suggest an entirely different approach to the warning problem.
Under current law, our view is that the all-or-nothing nature of the problem
springs from the largely nonjusticiable issue of decision causation. We
suggest eliminating decision causation as the "make or break" issue and
instead propose that the elements of fault and causation be addressed
together, rather than separately, to provide a unified fault-cause metric for
determining the extent of liability.
In Part II of this Article, we demonstrate why the causation issue in
failure-to-warn cases is nonjusticiable. In Part III we examine the responses
that product liability law has provided in attempting to deal with the
nonjusticiability of causation. In Part IV we examine why the all-ornothing regimes are both ideologically flawed and practically unworkable.
In Part V we present our proposal for an integrated fault-cause question.
Finally, in Part VI we examine the problems in implementing our proposal
and argue that, notwithstanding some difficulties, it is the best hope for
rationally resolving the ever-elusive hypothetical but-for causation
question. In Part VII we conclude.

12. See, e.g., Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some
Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420 (1999) [hereinafter Hanson & Kysar, Some
Evidence of Market Manipulation]; Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism
Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation,74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630 (1999) [hereinafter Hanson &
Kysar, Problem of Market Manipulation]. For a rebuttal, see James A. Henderson, Jr. & Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, Product-RelatedRisk and Cognitive Biases: The Shortcomings of Enterprise Liability, 6
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 213 (2000); and for a surrebuttal, see Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar,
Taking Behavioralism Seriously: A Response to Market Manipulation,6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV.
259 (2000) [hereinafter Hanson & Kysar, Response to Market Manipulation].
13. Mark Geistfeld, Implementing EnterpriseLiability: A Comment on Henderson and Twerski,
67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1157 (1992). For a response, see James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, The
Unworkability of Court-Made Enterprise Liability: A Reply to Geistfield, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1174
(1992).
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II. THE NONJUSTICIABILITY OF CAUSATION IN MOST FAILURETO-WARN CASES
In every failure-to-warn case there are two major causation issues:
injury causation and decision causation. First, a plaintiff must establish that
the product caused his or her injury.14 For example, in many
pharmaceutical failure-to-warn cases, the plaintiff may allege that the drug
manufacturer failed to provide adequate warning of the risks associated
with taking the drug. Defendants often respond that the plaintiff did not
contract the disease or other ailment forming the basis for the suit from the
drug but rather from another source.15 In some instances, defendants lay the
blame on background risk and claim that evidence of general causation is
unavailable.16 In other instances, if general causation supports the claim
that the drug was capable of causing the disease, the defendant may argue
that specific causation cannot be established because in the plaintiffs case
the disease may have been brought about by a medical condition unrelated
to the drug.' 7 These causation issues are subject to proof or disproof based
on hard science. They have been the subject of much debate in the postDaubertera and are not the subject of concern in this paper.18
The issue of decision causation in failure-to-warn cases has proven to
14.

See JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D. TWERSKI, PRODUCTS LIABILITY: PROBLEMS

AND PROCESS 120-21 (6th ed. 2008); OWEN, supra note 1, § 11.2, at 733.
15. See, e.g., Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1196 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that
the plaintiffs' expert testimony linking the drug to their strokes was properly excluded by the district
court for lack of reliability); Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 874 F.2d 307, 315 (5th Cir. 1989)
(applying Texas law and holding that the plaintiff "did not present sufficient evidence regarding
causation").
16, A plaintiff must establish that the defendant's product is capable of causing the illness
suffered by the plaintiff. This proof may be accomplished through the use of expert testimony. The
seminal case setting forth the standard for the admissibility of expert evidence in the federal courts is
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
17. See, e.g., Cavello v. Star Enter., 892 F. Supp. 756, 771 (E.D. Va. 1995) ("If other possible
causes of an injury cannot be ruled out, or at least the probability of their contribution to causation
minimized, then the 'more likely than not' threshold for proving causation may not be met."), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 100 F.3d 1050 (4th Cir. 1996). For a comprehensive discussion of general and
specific causation in the post-Daubertera, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL

& EMOTIONAL HARM
18.

§28

cmt. c & reporters' note at 443-63 (2010).

For review of post-Daubert developments, see HENDERSON & TWERSKI, supra note 14, at

122-33. For the view that post-Daubert courts are too restrictive with respect to admissibility decisions,
see Neil B. Cohen, The Gatekeeping Role in Civil Litigation and the Abdication of Legal Values in
Favor ofScientific Values, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 943 (2003). For the view that the application of
Daubert masks fundamental issues of liability in prescription drug failure-to-wam cases because the

difficulty in proving causation negates the plaintiffs right to choose to be exposed to material risk, see
Margaret A. Berger & Aaron D. Twerski, Uncertainty and Informed Choice: Unmasking Daubert, 104
MICH. L. REv. 257 (2005).
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be especially problematic to the law. Would the end user have made a
different decision as to how to use the product if an adequate warning about
its risks had been given? Assuming a fact finder decides that a product was
not reasonably safe because either it bore no warning or the warning was
inadequate, the causation issue must confront three areas of uncertainty.
First, how would the hypothetical warning have been phrased? After all,
many different possible warnings could be considered reasonable and thus
satisfy the manufacturer's duty to warn, yet a particular end user might
react differently to reasonable warnings that vary in their phrasing and
display. Second, would the end user have read the warning had it been
given? Third, would the end user have acted differently to reduce the risk
in accordance with the warning?
Over the past two decades social scientists have investigated the
efficacy of warnings and the variables that may impact end-user decisions
as to how to use a product. The literature is vast. 19 The number of variables
that affect whether a particular plaintiff would or would not have read or
heeded a warning is so substantial that it is sheer folly to predict whether in
any given setting a warning or an alternative warning would have been
efficacious. A few such variables are summarized here:
(1) Readability. Researchers have identified more than one hundred
indices of readability, reading level, or complexity of written material. The
choice of words and complexity of sentence structure may depend on the
target audience. 20 To decide whether any given plaintiff would have read
the warning or altered behavior had a different warning been given would
19. For an excellent collection of articles on this topic, see WARNINGS AND RISK
COMMUNICATION (Michael S. Wogalter, David M. Dejoy & Kenneth R. Laughery eds., 2005).
20. See S. David Leonard, Hajime Otani & Michael S. Wogalter, Comprehension and Memory,
in WARNINGS AND RISK COMMUNICATION, supra note 19, at 139, 146 ("For example, most of the
readability formulae assume that all shorter words and sentences are more understandable than longer
ones.... [B]ut using shorter words and sentences will not automatically enhance understanding.");
Stephen L. Young & David R. Lovvoll, Intermediate Processing Stages: Methodological
Considerationsfor Research on Warnings, in WARNINGS AND RISK COMMUNICATION, supra note 19, at
23, 31; N. Clayton Silver et al., Warnings and Purchase Intention For Pest-Control Products, 4
FORENSIC REP. 17, 29 (1991) ("Because most warning guidelines recommend that well-designed
warnings should be concise and written for the reading level of the lowest ability user, we expected that
people would be more willing to read shorter, lower-grade level warnings. Our results, however,
indicated just the opposite. The correlations showed that people were more willing to read warnings that
had text containing more statements and more difficult material."). N. Clayton Silver and colleagues
speculate that the participants in the study were taken from populations with higher reading levels than
the general population. Silver et al., supra, at 29. We note that the difficulty in choosing a reading level,
given the great variability among users, is a substantial problem in formulating an alternative warning
and in deciding whether an alternative warning would have been read and heeded.
For a review of the most commonly used readability tests, see George R. Klare, Assessing
Readability, 10 READING RES. Q. 62 (1974-1975).
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require an individual assessment of each particular plaintiff.
(2) Coherence. How the message is presented may have a profound
effect on its comprehensibility. Relatively minor wording differences may
affect whether a given plaintiff would have understood the warning.2 1
(3) Brevity and length of warnings. Although short warnings are more
effective, the optimum length of warnings is a matter of debate and is
highly contextual.22
(4) Location of warnings. Investigators disagree, for example, about
whether warnings should be set off in a separate "Warnings" section or
should be integrated in the instructions for use. 23
Of even greater significance are the attitudes and beliefs that a
particular plaintiff brings to product use. Biases in risk perception have a
profound effect on how a user may react to a warning:
(1) Overconfidence and optimism. Numerous studies demonstrate that
although people may be able to give fairly accurate assessments of the risks
associated with various consumer products, they do not think that the risks
apply to them personally. 24
(2) Availability. The tendency to overestimate infrequent causes of
G. Ray Funkhouser, An Empirical Study of Consumers' Sensitivity to the Wording of
21.
Affirmative DisclosureMessages, 3 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 26, 27 (1984) (showing that versions
of affirmative disclosures that differed in relatively slight and subtle ways produced significant
differences in consumer comprehension); Christopher M. Heaps & Tracy B. Henley, Language
Matters: Wording Considerationsin HazardPerception and Warning Comprehension, 133 J. PSYCHOL.
341, 350 (1999) ("Although more explicit and definite wording in product labels results in a generally
more believable warning, the improved warning's credibility may not necessarily translate into safer
consumer behavior.").
22. See, e.g., Young & Lovvoll, supra note 20, at 31.
23. Id. at 125-26, 241-42. Several studies support the notion that, contrary to common belief,
warnings should not be set off in a separate section. These studies found greater compliance when the
warnings were placed in the instruction section of the label. See, e.g., J. Paul Frantz, Effect of Location
and Presentation Formaton Attention to and Compliance with Product Warnings and Instructions, 24
J. SAFETY RES. 131, 132-33 (1993); J. Paul Frantz, Effect of Location and ProceduralExplicitness on
User Processingof and Compliance with Product Warnings, 36 HUM. FACTORS 532, 543 (1994). See
also Keyla Friedmann, The Effect ofAdding Symbols to Written Warning Labels on User Behaviorand
Recall, 30 HUM. FACTORS 507, 514 (1988) ("Almost 20% of the subjects... read only the first
sentence of the warning."); Jill Annette Strawbridge, The Influence of Position, Highlighting, and
Imbedding on Warning Effectiveness, 30 PROC. HUM. FACTORS Soc'y 716, 719 (1986)
("Approximately 35% of the subjects reported that once they had read far enough into the Warning
section to realize what it was, they stopped reading and continued on.").
24. Sarah Lichtenstein et al., Judged Frequency of Lethal Events, 4 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.:
HUM. LEARNING & MEMORY 551, 574-76 (1978); Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About
Susceptibility to Health Problems: Conclusions from a Community-Wide Sample, 10 J. BEHAV. MED.
481, 481 (1987).
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injury and underestimate frequent causes may be dependent on how
available information regarding injury frequency is to the particular
plaintiff. A plaintiff may be motivated to heed a warning because the injury
was the subject of media coverage or occurred to someone that the plaintiff
knew, but may disregard warnings that lack a similar sense of immediacy
or availability. 25
(3) Suppression. Consumers who have preconceived notions about the
risk associated with the use of a product are likely to disregard information
in a warning that is inconsistent with their preconceived opinions. 26
(4) Familiarity. Closely related is the phenomenon that consumers
who have personal familiarity with a product are likely to be resistant to
new information or warnings about dangers associated with the product.27
(5) Attitudes toward risk. Consumers exposed to the same perceived
level of hazard may respond differently given their relative averseness to
risk.28
In light of these variables, it is not surprising that the following studies
show a marked difference between those who noticed, read, and complied
with warnings.
25. See Twerski & Cohen, Informed Decision Making, supra note 4, at 632-34; Michael S.
Wogalter, Douglas J. Brems & Elaine G. Martin, Risk Perception of Common Consumer Products:
Judgments ofAccident Frequency and PrecautionaryIntent, 24 J. SAFETY RES. 97, 98 (1993).
26. See David M. DeJoy, Attitudes and Beliefs, in WARNINGS AND RISK COMMUNICATION, supra
note 19, at 186, 196, 200-01 & tbl.9.5. The authors note that "people holding preconceived notions
about the risk associated with a particular product ... will ignore or misappraise new information if it is
inconsistent with their current thinking." Id. at 196. When they do not hold strong views, they are at the
mercy of how warnings are framed. For an extensive discussion about how framing influences
decisionmaking, see Twerski & Cohen, Informed Decision Making, supra note 4, at 634-39. To
credibly assess the causal relationship between a failure to warn and plaintiff conduct, one would have
to determine a multitude of hypotheticals with different framing perspectives-a task beyond the
capacity of any court to accomplish.
27. See DeJoy, supra note 26, at 199-203.
28. Thomas J. Ayres et al., What Is a Warning and When Will It Work?, 33 PROC. HUM.
FACTORS SoC'Y 426, 428 (1989).
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TABLE. Percentages of Subjects Who Noticed, Read, and Complied with
Warnings
Noticed (%)

Read (%)

Complied (%)

Frantz and Rhoades (1993)a

57

42

28

Friedmann (1988)b

88

46

27

Otsubo (1988)

64

39

26

Strawbridge ( 19 8 6 )d

91

77

37

Study

Note: This table is taken from DeJoy, supranote 26, at 187 tbl.9. 1.
aJ. Paul Frantz & Timothy P. Rhoades, A Task-Analytic Approach to the Temporal and Spatial
Placement of Product Warnings, 35 HUM. FACTORS 719, 721-23, 729 (1993) (involving an
experimental study on file cabinets with warnings that alerted the user to dangers of tipping when
improperly loaded).
bFriedmann, supra note 23, at 515 (describing an experimental study warning about dangers of eye
contact and inhalation of liquid drain opener and wood cleaner).
'Shirley M. Otsubo, A BehavioralStudy of Warning Labelsfor Consumer Products:PerceivedDanger
and Use of Pictographs,32 HuM. FACTORS Soc'Y 536, 537-38 (1988) (explaining an experimental
study of an electric saw with warnings for users to wear gloves to avoid being cut by a sharp blade).
d Strawbridge, supra note 23, at 716-20 (describing an experimental
study on a liquid adhesive with
warnings that the bottle contained acid and should be shaken before use to prevent injury).

The variables do not demonstrate that warnings are worthless. Some
users will be attentive and will alter their behavior to heed a warning. But
the number of variables that can increase or decrease the impact of a
warning makes it clear that attempting to draw a causal relationship
between the absence of an adequate warning and a plaintiffs subsequent
injury is simply not justiciable. Courts would have to examine the mindset
of any given plaintiff with regard to each of the variables set forth (and
many others not listed) to determine whether a warning would have made a
difference. Furthermore, to the extent that several alternative warnings may
be reasonable, it is impossible to tell whether a particular plaintiff would
have responded to one or another of the alternatives.
The implication of this indeterminacy, if the causation requirement is
applied honestly, is that few plaintiffs, if any, could win a failure-to-warn
case. After all, even the most optimistic studies have shown that well less
than half of those to whom warnings are provided actually comply with
them. Thus, a majority of injuries that occur in the absence of a warning
would occur even if a warning were given. This of course means that to
have any hope of demonstrating decision causation by a preponderance of
the evidence, a plaintiff would need to show that he or she is more likely
than the typical product user to have noticed, read, and heeded the
hypothetical warning. Given the speculative nature of the inquiry
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(including the choice of a particular hypothetical warning), however, it
would be nearly impossible for most plaintiffs to demonstrate decision
causation by a preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, under an
honest application of the causation requirement, most plaintiffs in failureto-warn cases that are adjudicated under traditional tort standards should
probably lose. 2 9
Yet, this result would be highly unsatisfactory. While there may be no
credible proof that any particular user of a dangerous product would have
avoided injury had a warning been given, this is not the same thing as
saying that no injuries are caused by a failure to warn. For example, the
studies summarized above each show that over a quarter of the subjects
noticed, read, and complied with the warning presented. Avoidance of the
risk associated with the product by these users could have prevented over a
quarter of the injuries associated with the risk. A tort system that does not
provide some relief for those injuries undercompensates victims and
underdeters dangerous behavior by manufacturers. Thus, the result of
applying an all-or-nothing decision-causation standard in warning cases is
not acceptable. This is not a critique of traditional proof rules in individual
tort cases, which provide complete recovery for a plaintiff who
demonstrates by a preponderance facts supporting recovery yet provide no
recovery to a plaintiff who fails to reach that probability threshold. In those
cases, the legal system is awarding a verdict that is consistent with its best
assessment of uncertain facts. In warning cases, on the other hand, denying
recovery to all injured users when there is a high degree of confidence that
many injuries would have been prevented by a warning (or vice versa) is
inconsistent with the legal system's best assessment of the facts.
III. HOW PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW HAS DEALT WITH THE
NONJUSTICIABILITY OF CAUSATION
American courts have been uneven in their treatment of causation in
failure-to-warn cases. Under the guise of the heeding presumption, some
courts have done away with causation as an element of the cause of action,
effectively applying enterprise liability to warning cases. Others have
demanded rigorous proof of causation, thus erecting an almost unscalable
barrier to recovery.
Courts applying the heeding presumption almost invariably cite as
authority comment j to section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
29. See Twerski & Cohen, Informed Decision Making, supra note 4, at 644-45 (arguing that an
honest application of causation principles would negate recovery in most informed choice cases).
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The comment provides that "[w]here warning is given, the seller may
reasonably assume that it will be read and heeded; and a product bearing
such a warning, which is safe for use if it is followed, is not in defective
condition, nor is it unreasonably dangerous." 30
From this premise, courts argue that if a seller is entitled to a
presumption that a warning, when given, will be read and heeded, then the
product user is entitled to a similar presumption when a warning is not
given-that is, had it been given, it would have been read and heeded.3 1
The logic is flawed. If a product is reasonably designed and accompanied
by reasonable warnings, the defendant escapes liability not because there is
any assurance that the warning will be read and heeded. Indeed, as we have
demonstrated, there is little reason to have confidence that warnings are
generally read and heeded. Rather, liability does not attach because the
product is simply not defective. The manufacturer has done all it can to
make the product reasonably safe. When an appropriate warning is not
given, the question that arises is whether the failure to warn was the cause
in fact of the plaintiff s harm. Whether any given plaintiff would have read
and heeded a warning raises a difficult causation problem that is not
informed by comment j's assumption that a product with adequate
warnings is simply not defective. 32
The heeding presumption has, in many jurisdictions, taken on the face
of enterprise liability.3 3 Liriano v. Hobart Corp.3 4 is illustrative. The
plaintiff, a seventeen-year-old recent immigrant from the Dominican
Republic, was hired by a Bronx supermarket, Super Associated, as a
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A cmt. j (1965).
31.
See, e.g., Wooderson v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 681 P.2d 1038, 1057 (Kan. 1984); Butz v.
Werner, 438 N.W.2d 509, 517 (N.D. 1989); Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co., 423 N.E.2d 831, 838 (Ohio
1981).
32. This argument is fully developed in James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal
Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 278-80
(1990). See also Gen. Motors Corp. v. Saenz, 873 S.W.2d 353, 358 (Tex. 1993) (recognizing the logical
flaw in drawing authority from comment j to section 402A, but recognizing the heeding presumption on
policy grounds).
33. In a perceptive article, Professor James Henderson has identified strains of enterprise liability
in some failure-to-wam cases. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Echoes of Enterprise Liability in Product
Design and Marketing Litigation, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 958, 989-94 (2002). Henderson identifies
Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 170 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 1999), as a case that effectively imposes enterprise
liability. He also suggests that Ayers v. Johnson & Johnson Baby Products Co., 797 P.2d 527 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1990), af'd, 818 P.2d 1337 (Wash. 1991); and Hon v. Stroh Brewery Co., 835 F.2d 510 (3d
Cit. 1987), are cases that demonstrate a trend toward enterprise liability. This Article argues that the
widespread adoption of the heeding presumption has brought enterprise liability to a far broader class of
cases than Henderson identifies.
34. Liriano, 170 F.3d 264. The facts of Liriano, summarized here, are fully expanded on in Brief
of Defendant Hobart Corp. at 2-5, Liriano, 170 F.3d 264 (Nos. 96-964 1L, 97-7449).
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butcher's assistant. He was paid $250 per week in cash (off the books) and
was expected to work eight to ten hours a day for as many as seven days
per week for the same salary. The plaintiff understood and read very little
English at the time of the accident. He was injured on the job when he was
feeding meat into a Hobart meat grinder. He pushed his hand deeply into an
eight and one half-inch cylinder and it became enmeshed with the grinding
mechanism, resulting in the amputation of his right hand and forearm.
The Hobart grinder in question was thirty years old and was equipped
with a barrier guard permanently riveted onto the pan in which meat was
placed. As designed, the pan had sufficient clearance to allow pieces of
meat to enter the cylinder for grinding but the guard made it impossible for
the user to get his or her hand into the cylinder. Sometime during the week
before the accident, however, an employee of Super Associated sawed off
the safety guard, enabling the tragic accident to occur. There was no
question that had the safety guard been in place, the plaintiff would not
have been injured. The case went to trial solely on the issue of Hobart's
failure to provide a postsale warning relating to the danger of operating the
grinder without the safety guard. The employee's sole claim was that a
warning would have alerted either the employee or his employer to the
unsafe condition of the unguarded grinder. 35 In its brief, Hobart argued that
any failure to warn could not have been causally related to the plaintiffs
injury:
In order to allow such claims to reach the jury this Court would have to
believe that, despite the plaintiff's need for a job that compelled him to
work 50-70 hours per week for $250, he would refuse to grind meat and
be fired. Or even more unlikely, that the third-party defendant Super
Associated, who callously exploited cheap immigrant labor and who
removed the safety guard, would suddenly be struck by conscience and
stop selling ground meat until a new part with the safety guard in place
could be procured.36
Despite these arguments, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit upheld a jury verdict in favor of the employee. Speaking for the
court, Judge Calabresi found that even if the danger were obvious, the
manufacturer still had a duty to inform employees that they need not accept
the risks of using unguarded grinders. 37 Furthermore, as to the issue of
causation, Calabresi held that when the defendant's negligence had
35.
36.
37.

Liriano, 170 F.3d at 270-71.
Brief of Defendant Hobart Corp., supra note 34, at 40-41.
Liriano, 170 F.3d at 269-70.
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a strong propensity to cause the type of injury that ensued, that very
causal tendency is evidence enough to establish a prima facie case of
cause-in-fact. The burden then shifts to the defendant to come forward
with evidence that its negligence was not such a but-for cause.38
This burden shifting is, for all practical purposes, a species of
enterprise liability. First, a warning in English would have been of no
utility for the young immigrant plaintiff who had yet to learn the language.
No one suggested, and it is hard to imagine, a pictorial warning that would
have alerted the plaintiff to the absence of the safety guard. The argument
that there was no evidence that the plaintiff would have refused to grind
meat or that a warning would have convinced the employer to halt use of
the grinder until a new part was purchased and welded to the pan was set
aside because the heeding presumption shifted the burden of providing that
evidence to the defendant. What kind of evidence could the defendant have
presented to rebut the presumption? Anything short of an outright
admission by the plaintiff or the employer that he or she would have paid
no heed to the warning would not have rebutted the presumption. The
warning presumption, though formally denominated as rebuttable, was for
all practical purposes absolute. Thus, by the seemingly dry procedural
mechanism of burden shifting, the court transformed traditional tort
principles, which, as we have demonstrated, may result in
underenforcement and underdeterrence, into an alternative regime with
opposite results. Just as a regime of underenforcement and underdeterrence
is not acceptable, a regime that results in overcompensation and
overdeterrence is similarly unjust.
Another method used by courts to transform weak causal links of
failure-to-wam cases into victories for injured product users can best be
described as a "grapevine warning." In DeRienzo v. Trek Bicycle Corp.,3

the plaintiff had purchased a used mountain bike over the Internet. In the
two years following the purchase, the plaintiff regularly engaged in "bike
jumping." On the day of the accident, the plaintiff was executing a jump
causing the bike to drop five to eight feet off a ledge created by a rock
sticking out of a hill. Upon landing, the bike broke apart, throwing the
plaintiff from the bike and causing serious injuries. In addition to the claim
that the bike had an original manufacturing defect, the plaintiff alleged that
the defendant failed to warn that the bike could break when the user
engaged in jumping.40 Though such a warning was in fact included in the
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 271.
DeRienzo v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 376 F. Supp. 2d 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
Id. at 562.
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bicycle manual, the court held that the adequacy of the warning was a jury
question.41 The defendant bike manufacturer countered that the plaintiff
had never seen the manual and that the heeding presumption was rebutted
as a matter of law. 42 In rejecting that claim, the court held that
a jury could conclude that, had an adequate warning against jumping
been issued with the Bike . .

.,

the 'realities of society'-i.e., the realities

of the mountain biking community-might have resulted in Plaintiffs
friends advising him not to use [the particular] model for jumping, even
if Plaintiff had not read the warning himself 43
If the mere possibility that others might have read the warning in a
manual and have related the warning is sufficient to overcome an attempted
rebuttal of the heeding presumption, then the presumption is, for all
practical purposes, irrebuttable. Is the defendant to call hundreds, if not
thousands, of mountain bikers to testify that they had read the manual with
its inadequate warnings, and that even had the warnings been more
stringent, they would not have related the information about the dangers to
the plaintiff'
Just as the heeding presumption, the grapevine theory turns traditional
tort doctrine on its head. Under traditional doctrine, plaintiffs rarely can
credibly prove causation in failure-to-warn cases, and placing the burden of
persuasion on them is therefore tantamount to insulating manufacturers
from liability. Conversely, the heeding presumption and grapevine theory
make it so unlikely that such causation will not be found that applying
either or both of these theories creates a system very close to enterprise
liability in its results even if the system is not described that way.
On the other hand, some courts have been willing to rebut the heeding
presumption on specious grounds. Consider, for example, Golonka v.
General Motors Corp." The plaintiff, Ruth Golonka, parked her car in
front of her neighbor's house to load chairs into the truck bed. She
attempted to shift her transmission into "park" but apparently mis-shifted to
a position between "park" and "reverse." Before leaving the truck she did
not turn off the engine, remove the key, or set the parking brake. When she
41. Id. at 568.
42. Quoting Liriano, the court held that "the law presumes normality and requires the defendant
to bring in evidence tending to rebut the strong inference, arising from the accident, that defendant's
negligence [in failing to wam] was in fact a but for cause of the plaintiff's injury." Id. at 566 (quoting
Liriano, 170 F.3d at 271). The defendant argued that the plaintiff admitted that he had never read the
existing warning, and that thus the heeding presumption was rebutted and the defendant was entitled to
summary judgment. Id. at 568.
43. Id. at 570.
44. Golonka v. Gen. Motors Corp., 65 P.3d 956 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).
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walked to the back of the truck and dropped the tailgate to load a chair, the
truck self shifted into reverse, backing over her and killing her. 45 The
plaintiffs experts testified that the truck should have been equipped with
an audible warning signal or flashing lights that would be triggered by a
mis-shift to alert Mrs. Golonka to the danger.4 6 On appeal, the court held
that although Arizona applies a heeding presumption in failure-to-warn
cases, the defendant had successfully rebutted the presumption in this
case. 4 7 It reasoned that Mrs. Golonka had disregarded instructions in the
owner's manual advising that before leaving the truck the driver should
"apply the parking brake, shift to park, shut off the engine, and remove the
key."4 8 She had also ignored a buzzer that activated when she opened the
door with the key still in the ignition.4 9 The court concluded that because
she ignored safety warnings related to the accident, a jury could conclude
that Mrs. Golonka "would have similarly ignored adequate warnings about
mis-shifts."50
This conclusion seems wrong. An audible warning of a mis-shift
indicates that something is radically wrong and that the driver is in serious
danger of the car's shifting into either "drive" or "reverse." That Mrs.
Golonka did not pay attention to the rather humdrum safety suggestions in
the owner's manual or to the buzzer indicating that she had left the key in
the ignition seems hardly relevant to whether she would have paid attention
to an audible warning indicating that the car could take off on its own. The
finding is particularly offensive in that the plaintiff was killed in the
accident and is in no position to testify as to why she did not follow
General Motors' safety suggestions and why a warning of a different
magnitude would have made a difference. Arizona follows the "bursting
bubble" theory of rebuttable presumptions. 5 ' Once the presumption is
rebutted, the trial judge may not refer to the presumption in jury
instructions.5 2 Admittedly, on retrial the jury might still find for the
plaintiff, but without the presumption her case is at a serious disadvantage.
45. Id. at 960.
46. Id. at 966.
47. Id. at 972. The Arizona court held that once the presumption is rebutted, it leaves the case
and the "existence or non-existence of the presumed fact must be determined as if the presumption had
never operated in the case." Id. The appeals court reversed the trial court because it instructed the jury
that the heeding presumption shifts the burden to the defendant to prove that an adequate warning
would not have been heeded. Id. at 967, 972.
48. Id. at 972.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.at970.
52. Id.
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Another example of a questionable rebuttal of the heeding
presumption arose in Graves v. Church & Dwight Co. 5 3 In that case, the
plaintiff, who was suffering from indigestion after a heavy meal, took
roughly one and one-half teaspoons of Arm & Hammer baking soda in a
glass of water. Baking soda has been used as an antacid for more than one
hundred years. 54 The label on the box of baking soda for use as an antacid
read "'/2 tsp. in glass of water every 2 hours."55 The plaintiff thus took
approximately three times the recommended dosage.56 The plaintiff
swallowed four gulps of the baking soda and water mixture and
immediately experienced enormous pain in his stomach. The plaintiffs
experts testified that the baking soda in the plaintiffs stomach caused his
stomach to rupture. 57 They further testified that the baking soda box did not
contain warnings that overdosing could cause stomach rupture.s At trial,
the jury found that Arm & Hammer had failed to provide adequate
warnings but that the failure to wam was not causal since the plaintiff
would neither have read nor heeded the warnings if given.59 The plaintiff
argued that New Jersey applies a heeding presumption in failure-to-warn
cases and that the defendant had not rebutted the presumption. 60 The court
held that there were "several areas of evidence which sufficiently support
the conclusion [that the presumption was rebutted and] that a jury question
was presented." 61 The court noted that for five years prior to his accident,
the plaintiff had smoked two or three packs of cigarettes per day and that
he had a cigarette cough even though he was aware that cigarettes bore a
warning from the Surgeon General concerning health hazards. 62 This
evidence, the court held, "provided the jury with a basis to make an
analogy between [the plaintiff s] smoking in the face of the health warnings
on cigarettes, and his projected behavior if a warning had been on the
baking soda." 63
In Graves, there was other evidence that supported the rebuttal of the
presumption, 64 but the court's willingness to treat the plaintiff s smoking as
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Graves v. Church & Dwight Co., 631 A.2d 1248 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993).
Id. at 1252.
Id. at 1253.
Id. at 1258 n.8.
Id. at 1253.
Id.
Id. at 1250-51.
Id. at 1255.
Id. at 1257.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1258 (noting the plaintiffs inconsistent testimony as to when he last read the baking
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evidence to rebut the heeding presumption is troubling. That one might be
willing to face the possible long-term risk of ill health twenty or thirty
years later should not rebut the presumption that he would have ignored a
warning that overdosing on baking soda could cause immediate stomach
rupture. Without this presumption, the plaintiff was at a decided
disadvantage to prove that he would have read and heeded a warning.
Admittedly, courts could take a more limited view of what evidence
suffices to rebut a presumption.6 5 A narrower selection of admissible
evidence available to rebut a presumption, however, leaves the defendant
with fewer arguments to prevail on the warning issue. Once again,
strengthening the presumption simply means that the plaintiff will emerge
with a winner-take-all verdict.
In short, under the current regime, the heeding presumption in many
cases may be irrebuttable and thus tantamount to imposing enterprise
liability for product liability failure-to-warn claims. Conversely, honest
application of traditional tort requirements of proof of causation would
result in denial of recovery for most plaintiffs even when a warning would
have prevented many injuries. It is not credible that all injuries would have
been prevented by an adequate warning, and equally incredible that no
injuries would have been prevented by an adequate warning. Yet,
traditional tort requirements and their "cure" in the form of heeding
presumptions and the like push the legal system to one of these extremes.
Both extremes, though, fail to deal with the reality that the issue of
causation in failure-to-warn claims is not justiciable.
IV. IS ENTERPRISE LIABILITY WARRANTED IN FAILURE-TOWARN LITIGATION?
Artificial manipulation of the traditional tort model by utilization of a
heeding presumption is not the only response to the undercompensation
inherent in honestly applying the traditional tort model to warning cases. A
second response, one that would fundamentally change the tort system
rather than stay within its general boundaries, is that failure-to-warn cases,
as product defect cases, should be resolved by enterprise liability rather
soda label).
65. See, e.g., Magro v. Ragsdale Bros., Inc., 721 S.W.2d 832, 834 (Tex. 1986) (reversing the trial
court's finding that the heeding presumption was rebutted by isolated instances of laxity in judgment
and stating that "[elvidence of inattentiveness, unrelated to the plaintiffs ability to perceive or heed
warnings or instructions and which does not rise to the level of habit ... is not admissible to prove that
[the plaintiffj would have acted in a consistent manner by ignoring adequate warnings or instructions"
(emphasis added)).
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than by a system based on fault.
The most forceful proponents of enterprise liability in warning cases
have been Jon Hanson and Douglas Kysar, who have advocated such an
approach in a provocative series of articles. 66 Their analysis is lengthy, but
their conclusion is bold. Because of the provocative nature of both their
analysis and their conclusion, we address their articles in some detail.
Hanson and Kysar start from a now commonplace observation"human decisionmaking processes are prone to nonrational, yet systematic,
quickly jump to an important legal assertion:
tendencies" 67-and
"Ultimately, any legal concept that relies in some sense on a notion of
reasonableness or that is premised on the existence of a reasonable or
rational decisionmaker will need to be reassessed in light of the mounting
evidence that a human is 'a reasoning rather than a reasonable animal."' 68
The Hanson-Kysar reassessment of warning law is massive but can be
broken down into a small number of steps.
First, Hanson and Kysar present an extensive survey of modern
behavior literature that casts doubt on the assumed rational decisioninaking
that is at the heart of game theory as well as many legal liability rules.
Summarizing many of the important behavioral research findings of the
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky canon, 69 as well as work inspired by
the findings of those pathbreakers, Hanson and Kysar go beyond "merely
catalog[ing] a set of observed behavioral quirks" 70 to suggest a model of
decisionmaking that is "relevant to a broader and more realistic range of
behavioral contexts than the traditional economic actor." 7'
Second, Hanson and Kysar analyze the reaction of products liability
66. Hanson & Kysar, Response to Market Manipulation,supra note 12; Hanson & Kysar, Some
Evidence of Market Manipulation,supra note 12; Hanson & Kysar, Problem of Market Manipulation,
supra note 12.
67. Hanson & Kysar, Problem of Market Manipulation,supra note 12, at 633.
68. Id. at 634-35 (quoting Alexander Hamilton, in LAURANCE J. PETER, PETER'S QUOTATIONS:
IDEAS FOR OUR TIME 315 (1977)).
69.

E.g., JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman, Paul

Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the
FramingofDecisions, in RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY

67, 90-91 (Robin M. Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder eds., 1987); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky,
Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 343 (1984).
70. Hanson & Kysar, Problem ofMarket Manipulation,supra note 12, at 638.
71. Id. The quoted sentence goes on to indicate that the authors' decisionmaking model is also
relevant in a range of behavioral contexts broader than the "newly enhanced economic actor (with

biases) offered by [Christine] Jolls, [Cass R.] Sunstein, and [Richard] Thaler." Id. (citing Christine
Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A BehavioralApproach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L.
REv. 1471 (1998) (describing the economic actor model mentioned)).
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scholarship to behavioral research and its implications for our
understanding of consumer risk perception. The analysis begins with the
observation that the movement from negligence toward enterprise liability
for product-caused accidents is premised on three assumptions-(1) that
"[c]onsumers are imperfectly informed of product risks," (2) that
"manufacturers exert exploitative market power over consumers," and
(3) that "manufacturers are best able to insure against the costs of productcaused accidents" 72 -- and that the case for or against enterprise liability
depends on the accuracy of those assumptions.73 The reaction of products
liability scholarship to the first of these three assumptions, Hanson and
Kysar conclude, can essentially be divided into two camps: those who
argue that consumers underestimate product risks and those who argue that
consumers overestimate product risks. 74 The underestimation view leads to
the conclusion that increased manufacturer liability would create an
incentive for manufacturers to address risks that would not be borne by
them under traditional tort law, while the overestimation view leads to the
conclusion that increased manufacturer liability would lead to greater
inefficiency. After presenting a survey of the literature in this area,
including detailed consideration of the American Law Institute's 1991
Reporters' Study on Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury,75
Hanson and Kysar essentially conclude that this scholarship has missed the
point.76 The important issue, according to Hanson and Kysar, is not
whether consumers systematically underestimate or overestimate product
risks. Rather, that is a "small part of the story, because whatever their risk
perceptions might be independent of market influences, consumers will be
susceptible to manipulation by manufacturers within the market context," 77
and "[t]his susceptibility to manipulation produces an opportunity for
exploitation that no profit-maximizing manufacturer can ignore."" While
this claim is later softened by showing evidence that "at least some
manufacturer manipulation of consumers is occurring in the market
consistent with our theoretical prediction,"79 the policy prescriptions drawn
by Hanson and Kysar are much more suited to the broadly stated
72. Id. at 693 (citing Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived
Casefor EnterpriseLiability, 91 MICH. L. REv. 683, 706-12 (1993)).
73. Id. at 693-94.
74. Id. at 696.
75. Id. at 716-18 (discussing AM. LAW INST., ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL
INJURY (1991)).

76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 718-21.
Id. at 639.
Id. at 722.
Id. at 748.
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hypothesis than to the more tentative later version.
Third, Hanson and Kysar present their evidence of manufacturer
manipulation of consumers' risk assessments. They start by discussing
manufacturer manipulation of product perception unrelated to risk in
contexts such as gasoline stations and supermarkets,80 noting that "if
manufacturers manipulate perceptions of non-risk-related product
attributes, they likely do the same for risk attributes."81 They then present
their case for the existence of manufacturer manipulation of product risk
perceptions, noting such practices as labeling a food product as 75 percent
nonfat instead of 25 percent fat 82 and direct marketing of pharmaceutical
products to physicians and patients.83 The examples presented do not,
however, involve cases that would directly challenge the assumptions of
current failure-to-warn law-cases in which risk warnings are provided but
the manufacturers manipulate consumer perception of that risk for their
own ends (such as avoiding sales reductions or chilling the market).
Hanson and Kysar then turn their attention to cigarettes, a product with a
sordid marketing history that is well known but recited at great length
nonetheless. 84 While the cigarette story provides strong evidence that some
profit-maximizing manufacturers can and will manipulate their customers'
perception of a product even if such manipulation results in disease and
death, it is not clear how that saga makes any more points about failure-towarn law generally than the more mundane examples of gasoline stations
and supermarkets.
Finally, Hanson and Kysar conclude that the existence of such market
manipulation justifies enterprise liability:
Given a state in which consumers do not fully appreciate product
hazards, enterprise liability is the most desirable products liability regime
because it forces manufacturers, as the primary holders of pertinent
product information, to evaluate safety considerations when designing
and marketing products. Enterprise liability gives manufacturers an
incentive to make all cost-justified investments in product safety
because, by doing so, they gain a competitive advantage over firms that
do not make the investments (and therefore face higher liability costs).
Enterprise liability also represents the only products liability regime
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Hanson & Kysar, Some Evidence ofMarket Manipulation,supra note 12, at 1439-50.
Id. at 1429.
Id at 1451.
Id. at 1455-59.
Id.at 1467-1502.
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capable of providing consumers with an independent source of
information about expected product accident costs-price.85
Even if one accepts the proposition that manufacturers will necessarily
manipulate consumer risk perceptions as a profit-maximizing strategy, the
case for enterprise liability as the antidote to this economic imperative has
some important weaknesses. This is important because, while the HansonKysar analysis of the phenomenon of manipulation of consumer risk
assessment is quite extensive, the recommended conclusions paint with a
very broad brush.
For one thing, the Hanson-Kysar policy prescription-enterprise
liability for product-caused injuries-does not appear to be linked to or
limited by problems related to the lack of effective warnings. Rather, the
manipulation proposition serves as a justification for enterprise liability not
limited to situations in which the tort system would now require a warning.
Even if one accepts the entire Hanson-Kysar thesis about the futility of
warnings in a world of manipulative manufacturers, it is difficult to see the
connection between that thesis and the complete immersion in enterprise
liability that they recommend. After all, enterprise liability as they describe
it relates to a far larger class of cases than those in which, under current
law, a manufacturer might be liable in the absence of a warning. While
there are certainly arguments to be made (and debated) to replace our entire
tort system for product-related injuries with enterprise liability," the
Hanson-Kysar analysis is notable because it relies on a particular type of
manufacturer misbehavior (one that Hanson and Kysar might describe as a
rational survival technique in the context of a competitive marketplace) 8 7 the distortion of consumer risk perceptions by manufacturer manipulation
of consumers-to justify enterprise liability for product harm even in cases
in which, unlike warning cases, perceptions of risk play no role. Imposing
enterprise liability for all product injury cases would result in liability no
matter how safe a product is or how difficult it would be to make it safer,
thus abrogating not only current concepts of failure-to-warn law but also
85. Id. at 1554.
86. The extensive literature includes Geistfeld, supra note 13; Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue,
The First-PartyInsurance Externality: An Economic Justificationfor EnterpriseLiability, 76 CORNELL
L. REv. 129 (1990); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Products
Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1263 (1991); and
Henderson & Twerski, supra note 13.
87. See Hanson & Kysar, Problem of Market Manipulation,supra note 12, at 747 ("As a result,
the problem of market manipulation seems inescapable in an unregulated consumer product market.
Manufacturers, to survive, must behave 'as if they are attempting to manipulate consumer risk
perceptions.").
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accepted doctrines of design defect law. Perhaps Hanson and Kysar
intended to limit their enterprise liability prescription to the warning
context, but such a limit is difficult to find in their articles. In any event, the
advantages and disadvantages of enterprise liability more generally in the
context of product-related injuries have been debated extensively by
others,8 8 so we will address the proposal of enterprise liability in the
narrower context of warning cases.
The primary basis for Hanson and Kysar's conclusion of the necessity
of enterprise liability seems to be that
because consumers are subject to predictable cognitive processes that
depart from rational utility maximization, manufacturers have the
opportunity and incentive to manipulate consumer perceptions of product
risks. This problem of market manipulation ... follows from basic
economic logic-by lowering consumers' risk estimates, manufacturers
concomitantly raise consumers' willingness to pay for their products. 89

Even if this statement is accurate, the policy prescription that they take
from it has several problems.
First, the studies to which Hanson and Kysar point are largely limited
to consumers 90 and their buying decisions. Yet, many product-related
injuries that arguably could have been prevented by warnings are not the
result of consumer buying decisions. Rather, they relate to products bought
for a business purpose either by the plaintiff or his or her employer. Is
buyer manipulation likely to be as successful in that context? Certainly, as
Kahneman and Tversky, among others, have shown us, professionals as a
class are not immune to the sort of decisionmaking irrationalities that
bedevil nonprofessionals, yet that is not the same as saying that corporate
purchasing managers can be as easily or effectively manipulated as
consumers who are making single purchases.9 1 It is not clear to us whether
Hanson and Kysar intend to exclude this large category of injuries (that is,
injuries not brought about by manipulation of consumer preferences) from
88. See, e.g., Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 12; sources cited supra note 86.
89. Hanson & Kysar, Response to Market Manipulation,supra note 12, at 262-63.
90. It is possible that Hanson and Kysar use the word "consumer" in its broader sense of anyone
who uses a particular product, but the nature of the studies they cite suggests that the term "consumer"
is being used in its traditional legal sense to refer to people who enter into a transaction "primarily for
personal, family, or household purposes." U.C.C. § 1-201(b)( 11)(2003).
91. Even if corporate purchasing managers can be manipulated into underestimating risk on one
occasion, it would seem that when the risk matures to injury, as is more likely to occur as the size of the
enterprise increases, the professionals-who are repeat players-would be less likely to be fooled again
at the time of the next purchase. By way of contrast, most consumers are not repeat high-volume buyers
of their products.
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their analysis and policy recommendation.
Second, the Hanson-Kysar analysis is based on the assumption that
manufacturers have an incentive to manipulate warnings because
nonmanipulative warnings would deter purchase of their products or lower
the price that consumers are willing to pay. 92 While this assumption has
some resonance in certain situations, there are others in which it rings false.
For example, it makes sense to assume the existence of some cases in
which accurate risk perception might deter purchase (for example, if
potential buyers accurately perceived the risks of riding mountain bikes
"adventurously," perhaps fewer of them would buy the bikes) or affect the
sales price (for example, it is widely believed that automobiles that "sell" a
perception of safety-such as Volvo-may command a premium price as
compared to comparable cars that do not have the same aura of safety).
Cigarettes, the primary focus of one of Hanson and Kysar's articles, 93 fit
into the class of cases in which the Hanson-Kysar assumption is intuitively
valid. Yet, there are many situations in which the assumption has much less
credibility. For example, it does not seem likely to us that a warning on a
commercial meat grinder that one's fingers should not be placed in a
particular spot near the blades would deter butcher shops (or even home
cooks) from buying the meat grinder or from paying more for it. Similarly,
a warning on the packaging for a home drain cleaner that it is dangerous to
use in combination with other drain cleaners would not seem to reduce
sales volume or prices. Some risks, in other words, might be closely
connected to product-use decisions but are not closely connected to buying
decisions. Yet, Hanson and Kysar seem to generalize from the narrow set
of risks that, if accurately perceived, might deter purchase (or chill the
purchase price) to the full range of products and their associated risks,
including risks that, if accurately perceived, would not deter purchase at all
but, rather, would lead to safer postpurchase use. If the incentive to
manipulate perceptions of risk is present only when accurate perception of
the risk would deter sales or chill prices, however, the foundation for the
application of enterprise liability to a broader range of product-related
injuries is seriously weakened.
Third, even for unwarned risks that would deter sales or chill prices if
92. Hanson and Kysar make the point explicitly, but without noting the limiting effect it has on
their conclusions. See, e.g., Hanson & Kysar, Problem of Market Manipulation, supra note 12, at 724
("Other things being equal, it is in the manufacturer's interest for consumers to have the lowest estimate
of product risks possible: The lower the consumer's risk estimate, the more consumers will be willing to
pay for the product, leading to greater sales and increased profits for manufacturers.").
93. Hanson & Kysar, Some Evidence ofMarket Manipulation,supra note 12.
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only consumers were not manipulated by manufacturers, the manipulation
thesis does not take into account the market incentive of competing
merchants to counteract their competitors' spin. There are certainly
instances, such as with cigarettes, in which the risk is generically present in
the product itself and does not arise from any particular manufacturer's
version of it. In such cases, the manufacturers of the risky product each
have an incentive to manipulate risk perceptions so more units of the risky
product will be sold. In other situations, however, in which the risk is not
generic but instead is associated with a particular manufacturer's version of
the product, competing manufacturers, seeking greater market share, have
an incentive to counteract manipulations of risk perception that were
fostered by a competitor. For example, automobile tires vary widely in their
ability to stop a car safely in adverse conditions. A manufacturer that wants
to "sell safety" has a profit-maximizing incentive to counteract
manipulation of risk perception by a competitor whose tires are riskier. 94
Fourth, even limiting the enterprise liability solution to warning cases,
the proponents of the solution do not fully explore the connection between
the disease (manufacturers' manipulation of consumers' perceptions of
risk) and the proposed cure (enterprise liability). To say that enterprise
liability and its concomitant internalization of injury costs create an
incentive to manufacture safer products and encourage users to use them
safely is undeniably true (except when the internalization costs are so high
that the product is discontinued rather than being made or marketed to be
safer), but the point proves too much. After all, enterprise liability would
provide that same incentive even in the absence of manipulation of risk
perceptions. It is the asserted manipulation, however, that is offered as the
justification for enterprise liability.
If the goal of enterprise liability were to reduce the incentive of
manufacturers to engage in manipulation of risk perception, then one would
expect a "good" (that is, nonmanipulative) manufacturer not to face
liability in the case of injuries suffered after nonmanipulative disclosure of
risks. Yet, the enterprise liability solution would result in such a good
manufacturer's being subject to absolute liability nonetheless. Even if, as
do Hanson and Kysar, one does not believe that such good manufacturers
are likely to exist,95 enterprise liability will have the effect of not only
deterring manipulative risk disclosures, but also of continuing to impose
costs on manufacturers who have been deterred by the enterprise liability
94. Hanson and Kysar recognize this counterexample as a theoretical possibility but discount the
likelihood of such successful "debiasing." Id. at 1551-52.
95. See Hanson & Kysar, Problem ofMarket Manipulation, supra note 12, at 747.
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regime and are now abjuring manipulation. Thus, the enterprise liability
solution cannot be justified solely on a wholesome desire to deter
manipulation, since its cost would fall on nonmanipulators as well as
manipulators. Rather, the manipulation of risk thesis appears to be
somewhat of a red herring, rhetorically justifying a solution that is broader
than the problem.
Fifth, the proponents of enterprise liability in risk cases tell us that
enterprise liability and its accompanying internalization of costs create an
incentive for manufacturers to devise effective product warnings (because
all injury costs will be borne by the manufacturer), an incentive that is
lacking when it is less expensive for manufacturers to manipulate
consumers' risk perceptions than it is for them to suffer the decreased
profits that might result from nonmanipulative warnings. Yet, the
compensation model that is inherent in enterprise liability for warning
cases overcompensates plaintiffs and, thus, in the aggregate, overdeters
manufacturers and underdeters risky behavior by end users as compared to
a world in which manipulation of risk perceptions does not exist and;
therefore, enterprise liability as an antidote to such manipulation would not
exist either.
Let us assume that a risk associated with a particular product would
injure one hundred end users in the absence of an effective warning but
would injure only sixty-seven end users if the best possible warning were
given. 96 If the manufacturer fails to give an effective warning (or, as
Hanson and Kysar might suggest, provides the warning but simultaneously
manipulates the perception of risk resulting from that warning so that the
warning does not have the proper effect), there would be one hundred
injuries and, under enterprise liability, one hundred full compensations
even though only thirty-three injuries were caused by the failure to provide
the ideal warning (the other sixty-seven users would have been injured in
any event). Not only does this result overcharge the manufacturer (charging
it for one hundred injuries when only thirty-three were caused by its
conduct), but it also leaves undeterred the risky behavior of the end users
who did not bother to determine if there were any warnings, or who would
have proceeded despite any warnings. 97 If we assume instead that the ideal
warning is given by the manufacturer, sixty-seven end users would still be
injured. None of those injuries would be caused by the manufacturer; all
96. Presumably, the sixty-seven end users would be an unlucky subset of those who proceeded
with a risky use of the product without heeding the warning, either because they failed to read the
warning or because they are risk preferring.
97. See, e.g., Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 12, at 225.
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were caused by risky end-user behavior. Yet, under enterprise liability, the
cost of those sixty-seven injuries would nevertheless be borne by the
manufacturer and not the poorly behaving end users. Thus, the end result in
both cases is aggregate overcompensation of users and excess liability for
the manufacturer. Moreover, the juxtaposition of these two cases presents a
counterintuitive situation in which the more that a manufacturer does the
"right" thing (by providing an ideal and nonmanipulative warning), the
higher the proportion of the damages assessed under an enterprise liability
regime that will go to the undeserving.
This mismatch between the goals of the tort system and the
compensation regime that would result from enterprise liability in warning
cases does not, of course, mean that enterprise liability is an invalid
response to the warnings problem. Rather, it is a prescription that should
not be supported without acknowledging its weaknesses as well as its
advantages. In many ways, enterprise liability for warning cases would
have the opposite strengths and weaknesses from the traditional tort model.
The traditional model (in which liability is assessed only when it is
demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's
wrongful act caused the plaintiffs harm), administered honestly, would
likely (as we have argued in the informed consent context)9 8 lead to a
finding of liability in too few cases-because it is simply too difficult
credibly to demonstrate decision causation. On the other hand, the
enterprise liability approach would likely result in liability in too many
cases-recovery for plaintiffs whose injuries would have occurred even if a
good faith, nonmanipulative warning were given. Thus, the case for
enterprise liability is in many ways the mirror image of the traditional
model-overcorrecting its flaws rather than eliminating them.
A choice between these flawed models, then, is really a choice of
which sorts of systematic errors are preferred more than it is a choice of a
"better" model over a "worse" one. While many would choose, for
understandable reasons, to prefer one sort of error over the other (and we
suspect that more would choose overcompensating riskily behaving end
users than underdeterring manipulative manufacturers), would it not be
desirable to construct a better model than to determine which set of flaws
we prefer? That is the subject of the remainder of this Article.

98.

See Twerski & Cohen, Informed Decision Making, supra note 4, at 644-45.
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V. MERGING FAULT AND CAUSE: THE GATEWAY TO
PROPORTIONAL RECOVERY
Having demonstrated that both traditional tort doctrines of causation
and the "cures" that have been advanced for them result in seriously
flawed, all-or-nothing regimes, we propose a solution in which causation
plays a role in the resolution of products liability failure-to-warn cases but
does not allow its essential nonjusticiability to choke off recovery in its
entirety. The proposals to adopt enterprise liability and the willingness of
the courts to adopt heeding presumptions arise in large part from
frustration. Courts correctly intuit the unacceptability of a legal regime in
which, if causation is to be played "by the book," recovery will rarely
follow and manufacturers will lose the incentive to warn altogether or the
incentive to warn with sufficient clarity to affect consumer behavior.99
Consumers are entitled to critical information that can lead them to safer
product use; a legal system that offers manufacturers no incentive to
provide warnings that would undoubtedly prevent many injuries merely
because we cannot determine whether a warning would prevent the harm
incurred by any particular injured end user is neither efficient nor humane.
This does not mean, however, that all failures to warn should lead to
liability (as proponents of enterprise liability-oriented solutions argue)
without regard for any causal connection (or lack thereof) between the
failure and the injury. A system that allocates the cost of injuries to an actor
without regard as to whether its actions bore any causal relationship to
those injuries is not only unjust but also leads to suboptimal results.
Thus, it is not our intent to eliminate the important role that causation
plays in tort law. Rather, our point is that an inability to prove causation by
a preponderance of the evidence should not be the death knell of a failureto-warn case. Of course, assigning the demonstration of (or failure to
demonstrate) causation an important, but not necessarily outcomedeterminative, role in adjudication of failure-to-warn cases will require a
more nuanced examination of the factors present in each case. In this
99. In Golonka v. General Motors Corp., 65 P.3d 956 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003), the court expressed
concern that
[i]n light of the difficulty of demonstrating how an injured or deceased person would have
reacted to a particular warning, ... manufacturers who issue products with inadequate safety
warnings could escape any consequence, thereby decreasing the incentive for manufacturers
to adequately warn consumers of dangers inherent in product use. By easing the burden of
proving causation, "[t]he use of the heeding presumption provides a powerful incentive for
manufacturers to abide by their duty to provide adequate warnings."
Id. at 969 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Coffinan v. Keene Corp., 628 A.2d 710,
718 (N.J. 1993)).
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regard, it must be recognized that not all failures to warn are created equal.
Some warnings are more critical than others. Some warnings deserve
greater explication and detail. Some warnings are more or less likely to
prevent injury in the context in which the products are used. Thus, rather
than the current system, which first determines whether the manufacturer
improperly failed to provide a warning and then determines whether there
is a causal connection between that failure and the end user's injury, a more
thoughtful analysis would start the same way-by determining whether
there was a failure to warn-but would then ask how serious the dereliction
was. The failure to warn about some dangers or side effects may reflect
minor fault or indiscretion, or may be very serious. Under the current
litigation scheme, the seriousness of the dereliction is not addressed except
obliquely when asking the causation question. It is there that current law
tests the seriousness of the failure to warn by asking whether a better
warning would have changed the outcome in the specific case before the
court. But, as we have seen, testing the seriousness of the failure to warn in
a fact-specific context leads us nowhere. We cannot and will not know how
any individual would have reacted to a hypothetical warning that was not
given.
As a result, we propose that failure-to-warn litigation be freed from
the unacceptable all-or-nothing shackles of current doctrine and be
reformed by the creation of a regime in which causation plays an important
role, but not the only role, in determining which injuries that follow a
failure to warn are compensable. Under our proposal, a manufacturer who
has failed to warn under circumstances in which a warning should have
been given should be charged with a fraction of the harm following from
that failure, with the size of the fraction to be determined by taking into
account both the seriousness of the defendant's failure to warn (which
necessarily incorporates both the frequency and magnitude of the harm to
be avoided) and the likelihood that the warning would have effectively
prevented the plaintiffs harm. Such a regime would avoid the extremes of
both traditional requirements for causation and the replacements that have
been proffered for them. Under our proposal, a manufacturer whose failure
to warn is quite serious in light of both the number of likely injuries and the
magnitude of such injuries would not escape liability merely because the
legal system cannot know with certainty which victims would have avoided
injury had a warning been given.
It may seem that asking a jury to assess the percentage of
responsibility based on a combination of fault and causation is novel, but
there is a precedent for it in the context of comparative fault. The
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Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability contemplates a

merger of the two concepts in determining the amount of fault to be
assigned to each party. Section 8, titled "Factors for Assigning Shares of
Responsibility," provides,
Factors for assigning percentages of responsibility to each person
whose legal responsibility has been established include
(a) the nature of the person's risk-creating conduct, including any
awareness or indifference with respect to the risks created by the conduct
and any intent with respect to the harm created by the conduct; and
(b) the strength of the causal connection between the person's riskcreating conduct and the harm.100
Comment c notes that "[t]he comparative strength of the causal
connection between the conduct and the harm depends on how attenuated
the causal connection is, the timing of each person's conduct in causing the
harm, and a comparison of the risks created by the conduct and the actual
harm suffered by the plaintiff."' 0 ' If a jury can meld fault and causation for
the purpose of determining comparative fault, there is no reason a jury
cannot make a similar finding in deciding the portion of responsibility to be
borne by the manufacturer for the harm caused to the end user in a failureto-warn case. We do not propose the adoption of this rule generally
throughout the tort system. Rather, we introduce it here because of the
nonjusticiability of causation as a stand-alone issue in the failure-to-warn
context; in other words, if causation is an element of the case that must be
proved or disproved, whichever party bears the burden of persuasion will
lose. The fact that we cannot credibly resolve causation by the traditional
standard does not mean that we should not adopt a more flexible standard.
Admittedly, factoring causation and fault into a single metric for
liability calls for an estimate (or, perhaps, an educated guess) as to the role
of the failure to warn in causing the harm suffered by the plaintiff. And
having argued that the causation issue is so beleaguered by doubt that it is
not justiciable, we can rightly be asked whether our solution simply masks
the problem rather than solving it. But the move from an all-or-nothing
approach to one of proportional liability allows the legal system substantial
flexibility in assessing the role of the defendant in bringing about the
plaintiffs injury, and it is this flexibility that enables the system to escape
the straitjacket imposed by traditional causation standards and achieve a
more just result determined by a holistic view of the manufacturer's
100.
101.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB.
Id. § 8 cmt. c.

§8

(2000).
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conduct and its interplay with the end user.
We would not apply our proposal in all failure-to-warn cases,
however. While causation in such cases is, as we have argued in this paper,
usually nonjusticiable, there are cases at the margins in which a fact finder
can credibly conclude either that an injury would not have occurred had a
warning been given or that the warning would not have prevented the
injury. To account for such cases, we would return to the traditional role of
causation: the court determines that either party has demonstrated by clear
and convincing evidence that the failure to warn was or was not causally
connected to the end user's injury, and assesses full liability or no liability
in such cases without requiring the fact finder to make a combined
assessment of fault and causation. While at the extremes causation may be
sufficiently clear to permit such an all-or-nothing finding, the great
majority of cases fall in the middle where causation cannot be fairly
litigated under the traditional standard. These are the cases in which the
heeding presumption or lack thereof spells life or death for the plaintiffs
case. In these cases our proposal provides a sensible solution to heavy
overdeterrence or woeful underdeterrence.
In some respects, there is a parallel between our suggested solution for
failure-to-warn cases and the adoption of proportional causation in medical
malpractice cases in which a physician fails to timely diagnose a disease.
02
The seminal case is Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative. That case

involved a wrongful death action against a hospital and its employees; the
plaintiff proved that the defendant physician's negligence in timely
diagnosing lung cancer reduced the decedent's chances of survival. Had the
plaintiff been treated earlier he would have had a 39 percent chance of
survival. Belated treatment reduced his survival chances to 25 percent. 0 3
At no point in time relevant to the liability issue did the decedent have
better than a 50 percent chance of survival. Thus, it could not be
established that the delay in diagnosis was "more likely than not" the cause
of the decedent's death. Nonetheless, the concurring opinion argued that
the plaintiff should be entitled to recovery based on the 14 percent loss of a
chance of recovery. 104 A substantial number of courts have adopted
102. Herskovits v. Grp. Health Coop., 664 P.2d 474 (Wash. 1983) (en banc).
103. Id. at 475.
104, Id. at 487 (Pearson, J., concurring). As we have noted in a previous article, while the court's
decision in Herskovits to allow partial recovery is laudable, the calculation of the percentage of
recovery is questionable. Under the methodology we suggest to calculate the percentage of recovery,
the plaintiffs recovery would be 14/75, or 18.67 percent. See Twerski & Cohen, Comparing
Physicians,supra note 4, at 24-31.
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proportional causation in this genre of cases.' 05
This move away from all-or-nothing causation bears a resemblance to
our solution to the causation problem in failure-to-warn cases. In both,
unyielding allegiance to traditional causation burden-of-proof norms will
negate liability. The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical
and Emotional Harm notes that

[t]o date, the courts that have accepted lost opportunity as cognizable
harm have almost universally limited its recognition to medicalmalpractice cases. Three features of that context are significant: (1) a
contractual relationship exists between patient and physician..., in
which the raison d'etre of the contract is that the physician will take
every reasonable measure to obtain an optimal outcome for the patient;
(2) reasonably good empirical evidence is often available about the
general statistical probability of the lost opportunity; and (3) frequently
the consequences of the physician's negligence will deprive the patient
of a less-than-50-percent chance for recovery. Whether there are
appropriate areas beyond the medical-malpractice area to which lost
opportunity might ... be extended is a matter that the Institute leaves to
future development.1 06
The analogy between our proposal and the lost chance cases, though,
is limited. In lost chance cases, the seriousness of the defendant's
misconduct is not an issue and there is no combined assessment of fault and
causation. Rather, the physician's misconduct and the magnitude of the
patient's harm are assessed independently, and the amount of responsibility
that the physician bears for the harm is reduced based on the probability
that the patient would have been in the fraction of patients who would have
benefitted from proper treatment. That method of apportioning liability
would not be workable in the failure-to-warn context. First, unlike the
medical scenario, there are no hard statistics available as to the
effectiveness of warnings that might have been given to a particular
plaintiff. Second, the relative fault in failing to warn varies significantly
105. See, e.g., Mays v. United States, 608 F. Supp. 1476, 1482 (D. Colo. 1985), rev'd on other
grounds, 806 F.2d 976 (10th Cir. 1986); DeBurkarte v. Louvar, 393 N.W.2d 131, 137 (Iowa 1986);
Delaney v. Cade, 873 P.2d 175, 183 (Kan. 1994); Wollen v. DePaul Health Ctr., 828 S.W.2d 681, 685
(Mo. 1992) (en banc); Perez v. Las Vegas Med. Ctr., 805 P.2d 589, 591 (Nev. 1991); Scafidi v. Seiler,
574 A.2d 398, 408 (N.J. 1990); Roberts v. Ohio Permanente Med. Grp., 668 N.E.2d 480, 484 (Ohio
1996); McMackin v. Johnson Cnty. Healthcare Ctr., 73 P.3d 1094, 1100 (Wyo. 2003). See also Joseph
H. King, Jr., "Reduction of Likelihood" Reformulation and Other Retrofitting of the Loss-of-a-Chance
Doctrine,28 U. MEM. L. REV. 491, 496 (1998) (advocating proportional causation in "loss-of-a-chance"
tort doctrine).
106.

(2010).
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depending on the danger to be warned against and the efficacy of a warning
already given. Our proposal to merge fault and causation into a single
inquiry is the only practical method for avoiding the extremes of full
liability and no liability. It also allows a jury to make a common sense
assessment of the warning and its likely impact on the case at bar. That it is
impressionistic is its very strength. The science of warnings is too soft to
allow for rigor.
VI. IMPLICATIONS AND RESERVATIONS
We are sure to be asked whether our proposal favors manufacturers or
end users. We believe that it favors neither.'o 7 In cases at the margins, in
which there is clear and convincing evidence as to the presence or absence
of causation, our proposal does not change current law. In the great middle
ground in which causation is not justiciable, however, much will depend on
how a fact finder assesses the need for an adequate warning and how
effective the warning could have been to deter the harm that the plaintiff
actually suffered. This is as it should be. We are not advocating the
interests of either manufacturers or product users and have no way to
predict whether the aggregate magnitude of partial recoveries under our
system will be greater than those under the current all-or-nothing system,
although the numbers will likely be close. We are, however, confident that
such proportional recovery will lead to a fairer assessment of the need for
and the utility of a warning to any given plaintiff.
We do not advocate a similar approach for manufacturing and design
defect cases. As noted earlier, the causation issue in both manufacturing
and design defect cases is subject to verification by solid scientific
evidence. To be sure, experts may disagree as to whether a nondefective
product would have reduced or avoided the plaintiffs injury. We have no
107. Whether proportional recovery will lead to more settlements has been a matter of some
discussion. See Henry Woods, Trial of a Personal Injury Case in a Comparative Negligence
Jurisdiction,in 21 AM. JUR. Trials 715, 747-48 (1974) (arguing that defense lawyers in a comparative
negligence jurisdiction will be less inclined to refuse settlements when they know that the plaintiff's
negligence will not bar recovery); Thomas R. Trenkner, Annotation, Modern Development of
Comparative Negligence Doctrine Having Applicability to Negligence Actions Generally, 78 A.L.R.3D
339, 350-51 (1977) (claiming that counsel practicing in a comparative negligence jurisdiction may find
that cases settle more frequently). Whether increasing the rate of settlements is a positive good has been
the subject of sharp debate. See Derek C. Bok, A Flawed System of Law Practice and Training, 33 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 570 (1983) (arguing that law schools should shift focus from litigation to settlement or
other types of dispute resolution and claiming that more of the latter would help combat the growing
problem of inadequate access to the courts because of unaffordable legal fees); Owen M. Fiss, Against
Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984) (arguing against Bok and calling settlement the civil
equivalent to plea bargaining).
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reason to believe, however, that hard-fought litigation is incapable of
providing a credible answer to the causation issue in the great bulk of
manufacturing and design defect cases. For the reasons set forth in this
Article, though, we have no confidence whatsoever that causation is
justiciable in failure-to-warn cases.
Our proposal admittedly places an additional burden on the trial judge.
He or she must decide whether the evidence produced by either the plaintiff
or the defendant is sufficient to meet the clear and convincing standard we
establish for giving causation its traditional role. The jurors must then be
instructed that if they find that the party advocating the all-or-nothing rule
has not met the clear and convincing standard, they are then to assess
proportional responsibility. 0 8 The fault-causation issue should be preceded
by a question that asks whether the plaintiff has made a case for a failure to
warn. If a jury finds no failure to warn, or if a judge finds as a matter of law
that a warning was not warranted, there is of course no need to address the
question of proportional responsibility.
Although we acknowledge that a trial judge will have to grapple with
whether there was sufficient evidence to meet the clear and convincing
standard, we do not believe that we are adding much, if anything, to the
trial judge's burden. As things stand, judges must decide whether the
heeding presumption has been rebutted. As we have demonstrated, that task
is very daunting. Judges have little to guide them in dealing with this issue
because they face the impossible task of evaluating highly fallible human
decisionmaking. It is far easier for trial judges to assess whether the
evidence on causation meets the clear and convincing standard. This is a
task that they are familiar with in dealing with a broad range of legal
issues.109

VII. CONCLUSION
Few will argue with the proposition that the causation issue in
products liability failure-to-warn litigation needs sensible resolution. The
108. A jury instruction along the following lines would provide the necessary guidance:
Having found that the defendant failed to provide an adequate warning, you are to assess the
likelihood that a reasonable warning would have avoided or reduced the plaintiff's injury. In
deciding this question you are first to assess the plaintiff's damages and then take into account
the seriousness of the failure to give a warning and the likelihood that the warning would have
been effective to have avoided or reduced the plaintiffs injury. You are then to decide the
proportion of damages for which you believe the defendant should be liable. You may assign
responsibility from 0 percent to 100 percent as you see fit,
109. For a discussion of the most common issues to which courts apply the clear and convincing
evidence standard, see KENNETH S. BROWN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 569-70 (6th ed. 2006).
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dilemma is real. Society rightfully demands adequate warnings on products
to reduce the risk of injury. To date, the law has treated all failures to warn
to be of equal magnitude, and causation has been the tool utilized to
distinguish between failures as to which no liability is assessed and those
for which complete liability is assessed. Thus, while the gravity of the
manufacturer's failure to warn is not taken into account, the nonjusticiable
issue of causation is assigned the lion's share of the work. Yet, in failureto-warn cases causation is, as we have demonstrated, a seriously flawed
tool to accomplish that goal. Our proposal to resolve failure-to-warn cases
based on a combination of fault and cause allows the fact finder to assess
both the seriousness of the failure to warn and its possible causal
implications in a single finding that will determine proportional
responsibility. What this solution lacks in elegance it gains by providing
some semblance of appropriate deterrence for all failures to warn. After all,
warnings are necessary for risky products not because they will save all
users from injury, but because they will avoid or reduce injury to some.
Our proposal, by focusing on the seriousness of the failure to warn and the
possible impact on product users, brings the law a step closer to
accomplishing that goal.

